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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the determinants of the relationship between trade credit and bank 
loans. Previous studies of this relationship fall into two categories: (1) those emphasizing 
the difference between financial and non-financial institutions, and (2) those emphasizing 
the difference between credit instruments. By using data on trading companies that supply 
both loans and trade credit we are able to determine the relative importance of both 
institutional differences and instrumental differences for the trade credit-loan relationship. 
We find that trade credit and loans differ significantly even when offered by the same 
institutions, while loans extended by financial institutions and those extended by 
non-financial enterprises respond similarly. 
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1. Introduction 
Trade credit is a vital component of corporate finance in many countries. Japan is 
no exception with its corporate sector having about 15% of its total assets in trade payables. 
Compared to the vast literature on banking, however, trade credit has received rather 
modest attention from researchers. There have been several studies focusing on the 
relationship between trade credit and loans in Japan. Ogawa (2003) posits that trade credit 
was a substitute for bank loans during Japan’s recent financial crisis. In contrast, Ono 
(2001) finds evidence for a complementary relationship between bank loans and trade 
credit. Recently, the Japanese financial authorities have issued a series of policy packages 
to stimulate trade credit transactions since trade credit can be used as collateral to facilitate 
the flow of credit to firms. For example, since July 2003 the Bank of Japan has begun 
outright purchases of securitized trade credit as a part of its market operations. To 
accurately evaluate the effects of such policies, a better understanding of the relationship 
between trade credit and loans is needed. In this paper, we clarify the trade credit-loan 
relationship by examining the behavior of Japanese trading companies that extend both 
trade credit and loans. 
Researchers have put forth a variety of hypotheses on how trade credit is 
determined, and how trade credit is related to other financial instruments. We can separate 
these hypotheses into two categories. In the first category are those hypotheses that focus 
on the differences between financial institutions, which supply loans, and non-financial 
institutions, which provide trade credit. These institutional differences are important as the 
ability to acquire borrowers’ credit risk information, to efficiently liquidate collateral and to 
forcefully negotiate for smooth repayment differs substantially across financial and   3
non-financial firms. In the second category are those hypotheses concerned with 
instrumental differences. Differences in transaction costs, interest rates and moral hazard 
all play a vital role in determining the relationship between trade credit and loans. 
Previous empirical studies have looked at both sets of hypotheses. For example, 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) implement comprehensive tests based on detailed small business 
finance. The results of these studies, however, cannot identify which of these two 
categories of hypotheses are actually being tested. When these researchers observe that 
trade credit and bank loans behave differently, they have not been able to determine 
whether it is because non-financial enterprises have more reliable credit information than 
banks, or whether trade credit is fundamentally different than loans.   
In this paper, we are able to determine the relative importance of both institutional 
differences and instrumental differences for the observed behavior of trade credit in the 
Japanese economy. Our dataset, which contains aggregate balance sheet data, by size and 
industry, and also firm-level, small and medium business finance data, enables us to 
implement our study. We investigate whether financial and non-financial institutions have 
different lending behavior by focusing on a single financial instrument, such as loans. We 
also test if different credit instruments respond differently to exogenous shocks by 
analyzing the lending activity of institutions that deal with a variety of financial 
instruments, including trade credit and loans.   
In this regard, Japan’s giant trading companies, or Sogo Shosha, can be used as 
powerful instruments. Their size is immense, with several of these firms recording annual 
sales in excess of ¥10 trillion. They extend and receive trade credit so frequently that they 
at one time accounted for more than 10% of trade credit outstanding in Japan. In addition,   4
they provide a variety of financial commitments to their customers in the form of loans and 
other investments. In fact, loans and loan guarantees provided by these firms amount to 
¥4.5 trillion. 
A major contribution of this paper is the finding that institutional differences, 
between financial and non-financial firms, do not affect the relationship between trade 
credit and loans by as much as the previous literature has insisted. We do not find much 
empirical support for theories that emphasize institutional differences
1  in determining the 
trade credit-loans relationship. We do find, however, that differences in the characteristics 
of instruments do significantly impact the relationship, and that hypotheses based on 
instrumental difference are consistent with the empirical results.
2 These  findings  are 
critical to precisely evaluating the financial intermediation activities of both financial and 
non-financial institutions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Since we employ the Japan’s giant trading 
companies as instruments, sections 2-4 of the paper describe their financial activities in 
detail. Section 2 defines the scope of analysis for trading company finance. Section 3 
reviews the previous literature on trading companies, and their financial functions. Section 
4 summarizes overall trading company finance, as well as discussing its individual 
components. In this section we also compare trading company behavior with the financial 
activities of other industries. In section 5 we exploit the fact that trading companies use 
both trade credit and loans, and analyze the factors affecting the trade credit-loans 
                                                   
1  Specifically, the informational advantage theory and the price discrimination theory may not be the primary 
factors affecting the relationship between trade credit and loans. 
2  A recent study by Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti (2004) draw similar empirical conclusions in that they 
emphasize the high diversion cost of trade credit, and find little support for the informational advantage 
hypothesis.   5
relationship. We control for different financial instruments in section 6, in order to 
investigate the response of loans to trade credit shocks. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Defining Trading Company Finance 
We begin by defining exactly what a “trading company” is. Large wholesale firms 
in Japan tend to be net lenders of trade credit, holding more trade receivables than trade 
payables. These firms regard trade credit as an indispensable tool with which to extend 
their transaction channels, and not merely as a byproduct of their daily commercial 
transactions.
3  All of these firms contain credit examination sections staffed with credit 
analysts. Furthermore, those that deal with a variety of commodities make larger 
commitments, in the various phases of distribution, than those that deal with a specialized 
line of commodities. These large-sized wholesale firms, often called general trading 
companies, successfully utilize these commitments to efficiently allocate funds to 
borrowers. Given these points, we limit our focus to these general trading companies.   
There are nine general trading companies in Japan (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, 
Itochu, Nissho Iwai, Marubeni, Nichimen, Tomen, and Kanematsu), all of which we 
analyze in this paper.
4  It should be noted, however, that there are large differences between 
these companies. Moreover, recently some of the smaller, specialized trading companies 
have begun to enter into new business areas and have grown to the point that they have 
“caught up” with some of the smaller general trading companies. Among the nine general 
trading companies, the smallest four (Nissho Iwai, Nichimen, Tomen, and Kanematsu) not 
only lag far behind the larger five (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Itochu, and Marubeni) in 
terms of sales and other measures of performance, but also in terms of the restructuring of 
                                                   
3  See Ariga and Emery (1996). 
4  In 1977 Itochu acquired Ataka Sangyo, which was the tenth largest trading company at the time.     6
their organizations, such as mergers, sales of major businesses and a series of employment 
adjustments.
5  On the other hand, Toyota Tsusho Corporation, which has long been 
categorized as a specialized trading company, selling automobiles affiliated with Toyota 
Motors, has acquired many new businesses and, as of its 2002 financial statement, has 
larger sales than any of the four smallest general trading companies. 
We now define “trading company finance.” Trade credit transactions with client 
companies are the most important component of trading company finance. Wholesale 
businesses, which include general trading companies, use trade credit more heavily than 
other industries due to their high turnover rate. Financial Statements Statistics of 
Corporations, for fiscal year 2002, show that the ratio of trade payables to total assets is 
32.1% for the wholesale industry, well above the industry average of 13.7%. There are two 
ways to measure the size of total trade credit extended by trading companies: total trade 
receivables (notes receivable + accounts receivable) or net trade credit (trade receivables – 
trade payables). Since trade receivables and trade payables do not necessarily comove, in 
that a firm cannot stop paying for its trade payables even if their trade receivables are in 
default.
6  Therefore, it is better to consider trade receivables and trade payables separately 
for analysis. Although, it should be noted that the amount of trade receivables net of trade 
payables is useful when determining if a firm is a net creditor. 
                                                   
5  Nichimen and Nissho Iwai merged in April 2004 and adopted a new company name, Sojitsu. Tomen sold a 
part of their steel business to Toyota Tsusho with whom they plan to merge in the future. Kanematsu is now 
categorized as a specialized trading company since it has taken several drastic restructuring measures, 
including a reduction of personnel by 60% since 1999.   
6  Simultaneous cancellation of trade receivables and trade payables is only possible with an agreement 
between the two parties, and when the parties have trade credit with one another. But only about 20% of all 
the client firms to which general trading companies have extended trade receivables are also those to which 
they owe trade payables (from the Survey of Financial Environment by Small and Medium Enterprises 
Agency). In contrast, small companies are unlikely to have both trade payables and receivables with a general 
trading company, with the exception of a limited number of businesses, such as processing firms.   7
In addition to trade credit, general trading companies provide other sources of 
financing to their customers. From detailed information on (client) firms that have 
long-term relationships with the general trading companies through commercial 
transactions, or capital investments, we find that the trading companies are sometimes 
better at handling credit risk than banks.
7  Trading companies extend both long-term and 
short-term loans, invest in equities and offer loan guarantees to client firms, all of which 
are vital in maintaining lasting business relationships.
8  It should be noted, however, that 
some of the credit is extended for forbearance. Since sales and trade credit generally do not 
coincide, firms sometimes use loans, or loan guarantees to finance deficits rather than in 
extending business transaction channels.
9 
In addition to expanding traditional commodity transactions, general trading 
companies also engage in financial activities to earn profits. Examples of such 
profit-making activities include leasing, security investment based on specified money in 
trust, foreign exchange transactions, forward contract transactions and project financing. 
More recently the general trading companies have also entered into credit liquidation by 
asset-backed securities, provision of clearing functions of trade credit, financing social 
infrastructure by private finance initiative and establishing venture capital.
10 Because  some 
of these activities are off-balance sheet, and such a small part of these firms overall 
                                                   
7  The issue of the handling credit risk is discussed in more detail in section 5.1. 
8  Large wholesale businesses have higher ratios of other liquid assets (including short-term loans) to total 
assets and long-term loans to total assets, 10.7% and 4.4%, respectively, than smaller wholesale business, 
8.0% and 0.7%, respectively (October-December, 2003--from the Financial Statements Statistics of 
Corporations).  
9  For example, see the Study group on trading company finance (1977, p 148). For a counterexample, see the 
Fair Trade Commission (1974, p 8). 
10  For the recent developments in the financial activities of trade companies, see Itochu (1997, pp 142-44) 
and Kubo (2001, pp 40-47). However, is should be noted that it took some time for all general trading 
companies to realize the importance of these new activities.   8
activities, it is difficult to analyze these new activities in detail. Therefore, for the purposes 
of this paper we define trading company finance as the following items on a company’s 
balance sheet: trade receivables, net trade receivables, short- and long-term loans, equities 
of related companies, investment and loan guarantees. 
3. Japanese Trading Company Finance 
General trading companies in Japan are regarded as quite distinct from other 
wholesale firms. As mentioned earlier their scale is colossal, often totaling more than ¥10 
trillion a year in sales. These firms also deal with between 20,000 to 30,000 goods, 
including production, intermediate and consumption goods. Secondly, their commercial 
dealings include both domestic and foreign transactions and are often efficiently integrated. 
For example, the textile transactions of a general trading company include the entire 
distribution process, from cotton and wool purchases and imports to fiber, textile and 
clothes sales and exports. These commercial transactions are supported by a variety of 
activities such as investment, financial and management assistance and information 
provision. Similar types of businesses are rarely seen in the rest of the world, save for 
Korea and China. Because of this, these types of trading companies are specifically called 
Sogo Shosha even outside of Japan. 
Although general trading company finance is our focus, academic research in this 
area has been scarce. For this reason, we begin this section by reviewing the activities of 
general trading companies. As discussed in section 2, defining what a trading company is, 
and what trading companies do, is critical for any study. Researchers have defined Japan’s 
general trading companies in several ways. Shimada, Ko and Tanaka (2003) categorize 
trading companies according to the commodities traded, be it textiles, machinery or foods.   9
They define the objective of trading companies to be an expansion of sales opportunities, 
and investigate how each individual business area has been successful in this regard.   
Itochu (1997) classifies companies according to their functions, such as commodity 
transactions, investment, management, information processing and finance. He suggests 
that commodity transactions, investment and management as being the core functions of 
trading companies, and finds that the latter two functions have increased in importance in 
recent years. Finally, Yoshino and Lifson (1986) examine the impact of organizational 
structure, for instance human resource allocation and inter-firm relationships, on the 
outstanding success of these firms in business transactions.   
Another area of research investigates why trading companies undertake a myriad of 
functions. Rauch (1996) posits a theoretical model of discriminated goods, where firms 
themselves have to find customers without relying on the pricing function of markets. He 
shows that, in this case, the economy of scope pays off by reducing the search cost for 
customers. This is exactly one of the primary characteristics of the Japanese general trading 
companies. In contrast, specialized trading firms survive merely through providing a 
“middleman” service using industry specific knowledge, and do not depend on economies 
of scope in search to be effective. 
As one of the major functions of these companies, financial activities have been 
regarded as indispensable, through supporting commodity transactions, to borrower firms. 
Though dating back more than 20 years, the Study group on trading company finance 
(1977), not only contains the volume of trade receivable and loans for each general trading 
company, but also has qualitative evidence on how these firms finance customer companies 
to maintain their sales channels. The Fair Trade Commission (1974, 1975) examined if   10
trading companies violated the Anti-monopoly Act by implementing their businesses, 
particularly their financial activities. The report discusses several cases in which trading 
companies are suspected of not abiding by the law. In one case, a trading company 
extended loans to a client firm on the condition that the borrowing firm pays, to the lending 
firm, commission fees for every commodity purchased, even for those purchases without 
any connection to the trading company. The key issue, for our purposes, is not the possible 
violation of the law, but rather how closely the financial function of the firm is tied to their 
objective of having larger business transactions channels, and eventually larger profits. 
Since the 1980’s trading companies have sought to earn profits directly from their 
financial activities.
11  Ubukata (1989) interviews a large number of company managers and 
executives, and provides an intriguing reference on how trading companies invested money, 
procured at significantly low costs due to their excellent credit ratings, in the late 1980’s. 
When the bubble burst, however, these general trading companies suffered large capital 
losses, in securities markets. Kubo (2001) details the recent financial activities of trading 
companies, including venture capital investment and trade credit transactions settlement.   
While there have been a reasonable number of descriptive papers about trading 
company finance, not many researchers have taken an economic perspective in their 
analysis of the financial activities of these companies. Ariga and Emery (1996) and Sheard 
(1989) are notable exceptions. Ariga and Emery (1996) conduct a survey study on the use, 
by general and specialized trading companies, of notes payable and receivable. They gather 
information on the ratio of payment on credit to all business transactions, factors affecting 
payment period and the discount rate of notes. One of their interesting findings is that 
                                                   
11  See Itochu (1997) for a listing of activities. These activities are also discussed in more detail in section 2.   11
general trading companies are more flexible than specialized firms are at changing trade 
credit terms in accordance with their customers’ financial status. Sheard (1989) suggests 
that the reason these companies hold trade credit is to bear the default risk of clients, and 
that seemingly meaningless trade credit transactions are motivated by economic incentives. 
He also shows general trading company finance to be the sum of trade credit and loans 
extended. Therefore, focusing on trade credit extended by general trading companies, and 
contrasting this with loans extended is a meaningful exercise since both of these 
instruments are regarded as financial tools. 
With the exception of these papers, not much more research has been done in the 
area. In particular, it is difficult to find work on, not only the use of trade credit by trading 
companies, but also on the use of loans, loan guarantees and investment in equities of 
related companies by trading companies. In addition, while other firms also engage in 
financial activities, their activities have not been fully compared with the activities of 
trading companies. Therefore, we undertake a quantitative investigation of trading 
company finance. We begin by summarizing overall trading company finance and its 
components. We then compare the financial activities of trading companies with the 
financial activities of other industries. 
4. Time-Series Analysis of Trading Company Assets 
In this section we analyze the behavior of general trading companies in credit 
markets. The analysis is based on time-series data from two sources: the financial 
statements of individual general trading companies, and the aggregated Financial 
Statements Statistics of Corporations. We first summarize each of the trading companies’ 
financial instruments (trade receivables, loans, loan guarantees, the equity of related firms   12
and investment) in order to note similarities and differences in firm use of these instruments. 
We next utilize the fact that other non-financial businesses provide financing to firms in 
order to contrast trading company finance with finance by other institutions, such as the 
manufacturing and construction businesses. 
4.1. Trading Company Finance by Instrument 
Financial statement data for the nine major general trading companies comes from 
the Development Bank of Japan’s Industrial Financial Databank. We aggregate each 
balance sheet item for fiscal years (FY) 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2002. Table 4-1 
displays amounts outstanding, for the general trading companies, of trade credit, short- and 
long-term loans, equities of related firms, investment and loan guarantees for these years. 
Table 4-2 displays trade payables and loans, from financial institutions, received by all 
corporations (excluding financial and insurance businesses) in Japan.   
From the tables it is clear that trade receivables are the primary form of credit 
extended by trading companies. Trading companies provide a sizable share of the trade 
credit extended to corporations in Japan, as high as 12% in FY 1973, and, even after a 
significant reduction in the size of trading companies due to falling sales in the 1990’s, 3% 
in FY 2002. Net trade receivables, the difference between trade receivables and trade 
payables, has been positive over time, indicating that general trading companies are a key 
source of trade credit for the rest of the economy. 
The major trading companies also hold a significant amount of short- and long-term 
loans, more than ¥1.5 trillion in FY 1990, which is comparable to a medium-sized regional 
bank, though not comparable to loans extended by all financial institutions in Japan. 
Equities of related firms, investments, and loan guarantees are also quite sizable. Equities   13
and investments, in particular, have doubled in the 1990’s, while trade receivables and 
loans have declined. 
Figure 4-1 plots each balance sheet item against total assets for the general trading 
companies.
12  We can see that trade receivables relative to total assets has declined since 
FY 1984. As of FY 2002 trade receivables account for 25.5% of total assets, which is less 
than half its share in FY 1960. Accounts receivable, a major part of trade receivables, has 
also fallen against total assets, by about two-thirds since FY 1960. The decline in trade 
receivables can be attributed to the decreased use of notes payable. Notes payable are 
subject to stamp taxes and back-office processing fees, which these firms try to avoid.
13 
Another reason for the decline is that, in the late 1980’s total assets of general trading 
companies exploded. These firms exploited their excellent credit ratings and issued 
considerable amounts of commercial paper and corporate bonds. Over the entire sample, 
we also see that net trade credit has been positive, and even moderately increased in the 
1980’s. However, trading companies such as Marubeni and Itochu have significantly 
reduced their net trade credit positions in the adverse financial environment of 1990’s. 
Long- and short-term loans have fallen relative to total assets in recent years, but 
have remained in the range of 3% to 6%. In contrast, holdings of shares of related firms, 
and the investment ratio have risen dramatically from about 1%, at the beginning of the 
sample, to near 20% at the end. The loan guarantee ratio also increases in the latter half of 
the sample. There are two possible explanations for the observed increases in stock 
investment and loan guarantees over the sample. The first explanation centers on an effort 
                                                   
12  We look at the balance sheet items relative to total assets to adjust for the size of the economy. Petersen 
and Rajan (1997) also employ the value of total assets to normalize each balance-sheet item. 
13  For promissory notes of more than ¥100,000, issuers pay, at most, 0.2% of the value for stamp taxes.   14
by general trading companies to stimulate commodity transactions, which is a traditional 
intermediary role of trading companies. For example, investing in related firms develops 
strong managerial ties, facilitating commodity transactions between the general trading 
companies and related firms. Loan guarantees to finance the daily operational activities of 
client companies also help general trading companies to increase their commodity 
transactions. Moreover, loan guarantees are preferred to traditional loans since the 
guarantees do not expose the general trading companies to foreign exchange rate risk, or 
other depreciation risk. The second motivation for increasing the share of these two assets 
is to earn profits directly from financial transactions without having to engage in business 
transactions or sales. Examples include private equity investment and loan guarantees for 
project financing, both of which are not necessarily accompanied by commodity 
transactions. Rather, trading companies obtain capital gains or commission fees from them. 
4.2. Financial Instruments and Business Conditions 
From figure 4-1 it is evident that the trade receivables ratio declines during 
recessionary periods, while the other credit measure ratios increase. It is not enough, 
however, to look at how these financial instruments move with the business cycle on an 
annual basis since business condition statistics are usually reported at a monthly, or 
quarterly frequency. To be more careful in accounting for business trends, we employ 
quarterly data from the Quarterly Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations of 
large-sized wholesale businesses, available from the Ministry of Finance, and the Tankan 
Survey Diffusion Index (DI) of business conditions,
14  available from the Bank of Japan.
15 
                                                   
14  The survey covers wholesale businesses. 
15  The Business Condition Diffusion Index (DI) of BOJ’s Tankan survey begins in June 1965. Until March 
1974 we employ the DIs for the major firms. After this time we use the DIs for all-Japan firms, which better 
represents the overall economy.   15
The Tankan Survey DI of business conditions measures the percentage difference between 
firms that regard current business conditions as “good” and those that regard current 
conditions as “bad”. The DI is frequently used as a proxy for Japanese business 
conditions.
16  Large-sized wholesale companies are those with at least ¥1 billion in capital, 
which include the nine general trading companies.
17  Based on these two data sets, we 
calculate the correlations between business conditions and the financial instruments of 
wholesale businesses. It should be noted that some financial instruments, such as 
short-term loans and investments, are aggregated with other miscellaneous items, and that 
loan guarantees are not available on the Quarterly Financial Statements Statistics of 
Corporations.
18  The correlations are presented in table 4-3.
19 
The table shows that trade receivables moves quite differently from the other credit 
instruments over the business cycle. The trade receivables ratio is significantly, positively 
correlated with the Tankan DI, while the other liquid assets ratio, long-term loans ratio and 
the stocks of related firms ratio are all significantly negatively correlated with the Tankan 
DI. Thus, as business conditions decline, the trade receivables share of total assets increases, 
while in better economic environments its share declines. 
Looking at lagged correlation coefficients, we observe another significant 
                                                   
16  See for example, Kamada and Masuda (2001). 
17  There are 594 wholesale firms with at least ¥1 billion of capital in the third quarter of 2003, including the 
nine general trading companies. Combined total assets of these firms amount to ¥73.8 trillion, with ¥41.4 
trillion being accounted for by the nine general trading companies in FY 1990. In FY 2002 these figures are 
¥55.6 trillion and ¥21.0 trillion, respectively. These numbers make clear that these statistics are primarily 
attributable to large-sized wholesale businesses. 
18  In addition to short-term loans, other liquid assets include advances, prepaid expenses, mortgage securities, 
accrued revenue and accrued income. Investments and other fixed assets (excluding stocks, bonds and 
long-term loans) include investments, deposits for renting real estate, long-term prepaid expenses and 
golf-club memberships. 
19  Regression analysis would be ideal, but given five observations per balance sheet item, it is just not 
feasible.   16
difference between the credit instruments. The significance and sign of trade receivables 
does not depend on the lag length. In contrast, at lags longer than four quarters, other liquid 
assets displays insignificantly negative correlations, while at lags longer than seven the 
correlations are significantly positive. Finally, the correlation of long-term loans with the 
DI is always insignificant and negative.   
4.3. Trends in Trading Company Finance 
In the preceding subsection, we showed, using the individual asset-side items of 
general trading companies, that the ratio of trade credit provided by these firms is 
positively correlated with a measure of macroeconomic business conditions, while loans 
extended by these firms is negatively correlated. In this subsection, we aggregate assets in 
order to observe the relationship between total trading company finance and business 
conditions. 
Trade receivables are by far the largest component of trading company finance, 
particularly prior to the 1980’s. Therefore, its positive correlation with business conditions 
long dominated the overall positive correlation of trading company finance with business 
cycles. For the nine general trading companies, trade receivables is still the largest of the 
credit market instruments, although its dominance has declined since FY 1990. Its share in 
total assets has fallen to less than half of its FY 1960 value. In contrast, the use of stock 
investments and loan guarantees, as discussed in subsection 4.1, has been increasing.   
Due to inconsistencies in measurement between market values and book values we 
cannot immediately see the increase in stock acquisitions of related firms as a sign of 
stronger managerial commitment toward these related companies. However, there are many 
cases of trading companies choosing prospective clients in which to invest with the   17
objective of establishing stronger firm relationships. The trading companies not only offer 
trade credit to these firms, but also dispatch executives to them. For example, Mitsubishi 
Corporation recently acquired stock in one of the largest convenience store chains in Japan, 
and dispatched a CEO to run the company. In addition, the company has invested in several 
major food wholesalers, in an effort to make its food distribution channel more efficient. As 
seen in table 4-3, however, this type of action is counter-cyclically related to the business 
conditions, and so contrasts with trade credit movements. 
Another component of trading company finance that has been gaining in importance 
is loan guarantees. Trading companies use this credit instrument to support their customers 
in borrowing from financial institutions. Trading companies sometimes use loan guarantees 
as a substitute for loans, allowing them to avoid having credit, or foreign exchange risks 
added to their balance sheets. Since loan guarantees and loans are substitutes, we expect the 
loan guarantee ratio to be negatively correlated with business conditions.
20 
Table 4-4 displays the correlation between overall trading company finance and 
business conditions. Here trading company finance is comprised of trade receivables, other 
liquid assets, long-term loans, stocks of related firms and investments and other fixed 
assets.
21  Correlations between each instrument, relative to total assets, and the DI of Bank 
of Japan’s (BOJ) Tankan, from the second quarter of 1975, are displayed. One thing to note 
is the possibility of a structural change in the use of trade credit. As mentioned in 
subsection 4.1, there was a significant drop in the use of trade credit in the late 1980’s, 
                                                   
20  It should be noted, however, that in case of loan defaults, the correlation between loan guarantees and 
business conditions could be positive. Loan defaults, which are expected to occur more often in economic 
downturns, decrease loan guarantees outstanding, thus, resulting in a positive relationship between business 
conditions and loan guarantees to total assets. 
21  As stated earlier the Quarterly Financial Statements Statistics, unfortunately, have no data on loan 
guarantees.    18
especially notes payable and receivable as trading companies attempted to evade stamp 
taxes, as well as the administration costs for the notes. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show that the 
trade receivables to total assets ratio has dropped by more than 10% for the major trading 
companies between 1985 and 1990.
22  We, therefore, divide our sample into three 
sub-samples: 1975:2-1984:4, 1985:1-1989:4 and 1990:1-2003:3. From the table we see that 
the correlation becomes significantly negative later in the sample period. 
What is the implication of this larger, significant negative correlation between 
trading company finance and business conditions? A smaller share of trade receivables and 
a larger share of stock investments imply that trading companies have made a stronger 
commitment to extending lasting financial assistance to prospective client firms. In 
addition, despite the fact that the ratio of short- and long-term loans to total assets has 
decreased, the loan guarantee ratio has risen. This implies that trading companies have 
made a commitment to provide credit through loans whether or not they are actually 
extended by the companies themselves. 
4.4. Comparison with Other Industries 
In this section, we compare financing by trading companies to financing by other 
industries. We compare the major trading companies with large-sized manufacturing and 
construction companies, because these firms, similar to the trading companies, also supply 
loans and extend trade credit. We look at the size of trade receivables, loans and other 
credit instruments, the ratios of these instruments to total assets and finally their 
relationship with business conditions. We examine manufacturing, not only as a contrast 
                                                   
22  The null hypothesis of no significant difference in correlation for the three periods (85/1-3, 
85/4-6-89/10-12 and 90/1-3) is easily rejected. Maximum F-statistics to reject the null is reached when we 
divide the samples in 87/4-6 and also in 88/10-12. Table 4-4 also calculates the correlation coefficients for 
these sample periods, and we obtain similar results.   19
with non-manufacturing industries, but also to see if manufacturing firms are more, or less 
flexible than wholesale firms in the conditions of trade credit. Finally, we focus on the 
construction sector because the larger firms in this industry use trade credit more frequently 
than other non-manufacturing industries. 
Table 4-5 shows that all of these industries have provided a significant amount of 
financing to the Japanese economy in the form of trade receivables, long- and short-term 
loans, stocks of related firms and investments. In the manufacturing and construction 
businesses, the ratios of trade receivables and long- and short-term loans to total assets are 
smaller than what we find for trading companies, while those of stocks and investments are 
larger. Table 4-6 displays the correlation between business conditions for each industry and 
the ratios of individual financial instruments to total assets. Correlations of trade 
receivables and those of other financial measures are opposite in sign, both in the 
manufacturing, and the construction sectors. Correlations between the trade receivables 
ratio and the Tankan DI are positive across all three industries, while the correlation 
between long- and short-term loans and the Tankan DI tend to be negative. From these 
comparisons, it is evident that the pro-cyclicality of trade receivables and the 
counter-cyclicality of loans are common across industries, although the degree of 
cyclicality differs.   
5. Accounting for Instrumental Differences in the Relationship between Trade Credit 
and Loans   
There has been an abundant body of literature on the determinants of trade credit 
and its relationship with loans of financial institutions. Previous researchers have pointed 
out that non-financial businesses have certain advantages over financial institutions in   20
providing credit, including information about the credit-worthiness of borrowers, which 
they acquire through their daily commercial transactions. Many of these advantages are 
ascribed to non-financial firms making commodity transactions, which financial 
institutions do not and cannot undertake. Other researchers have emphasized the difference 
between these instruments since trade credit appears to be inseparable from the trade of 
goods, while loans are often distinct from commodity transactions. This section and section 
6 address two issues. First is the relationship between trade credit and loans, when the same 
institution extends both forms of credit. Second are the responses of loans, extended by 
financial and non-financial entities, to trade credit shocks. In section 5, we control for 
differences in credit institutions by regarding trading companies as institutions that advance 
both trade credit and loans.   
5.1. Previous Literature on the Relationship between Trade Credit and Loans 
There are a variety of theoretical explanations for how trade credit is determined, 
as well as a variety of theoretical explanations of the trade credit-loans relationship. 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) discuss several of these theories. To reiterate, the financial 
advantage hypothesis stresses the informational superiority of non-financial firms over 
financial institutions in making loans or extending trade credit. Non-financial firms are 
better at acquiring more accurate and updated credit risk information on borrower firms 
through their daily commodity transactions. The hypothesis also emphasizes the advantages 
that non-financial firms have in salvaging value from existing inventories held by buyer 
firms, and in controlling buyers by threatening to cut off their supply of commodities.
23 
                                                   
23  Nevertheless, some practitioners believe financial institutions have more accurate credit information on 
borrowers. A main bank can trace its borrowers’ flow of funds using bank accounts with the bank to 
determine the quantitative, as well as the overall, financial status of its borrowers. In contrast, trading 
companies are sometimes seen to have a narrow view of purchasers’ credit risk through their own commercial   21
Based on the idea of financial advantage, Smith (1987), Frank and Maksimovic (1998) and 
Bond (2004) posit theoretical models of trade credit.   
Price discrimination theory predicts that non-financial companies provide trade 
credit or loans to firms with higher credit risk in order to facilitate their sales to these 
financially constrained firms.
24  The final theory discussed by Peterson and Rajan (1997) is 
transaction cost reduction. The idea is that trade credit enables firms to bundle various 
payment commitments into one by synchronizing their payment dates, and, therefore, to 
reduce transaction costs.
25  Recently, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) propose a diversion 
hypothesis, which emphasizes the different degrees of moral hazard between firms 
receiving cash from loans and those receiving inputs for trade credit.   
The first two of these theories stress the institutional advantage that non-financial 
businesses have over financial institutions. Information acquisition, controlling the buyer, 
salvaging inventory value and stimulating the buyers’ commodities demand are all part of 
the advantage. In addition, the means of financial assistance, whether loans or trade credit, 
do not matter to non-financial institutions. In contrast, the latter two hypotheses stress the 
instrumental differences between trade credit and loans. The implications of the two 
theories, however, are quite different. 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the trade credit-loans relationship according to the 
transaction cost reduction hypothesis. Its presumption is that a firm has already decided to 
use credit before a creditor provides either a loan or trade credit. The firm then compares 
the transaction costs of either obtaining a bank loan, in order to pay for goods from a 
                                                                                                                                                               
transactions. 
24  See Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988). 
25 See  Ferris  (1981).   22
supplier, or the cost of exchanging trade payables for goods. The more uncertain the firm is 
in the timing of the purchase, the cheaper it is to choose trade credit over loans.   
In contrast, the diversion hypothesis, as illustrated by figure 5-2, presumes no 
commitment of purchase prior to procurement. Without any concrete purchase commitment, 
a firm need not simultaneously consider the transaction cost of purchase, procurement and 
payment. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) introduce the notion of “diversion,” which is when 
a firm uses financial resources for purposes other than those for which it was originally 
intended. An example of this is when a firm borrows money to purchase machinery, but 
instead uses those funds to pay its workers. The higher the probability of diversion, the 
more a creditor prefers that a firm apply for an instrument with a higher diversion cost, 
since its expected loss shrinks with difficult-to-divert credit instruments. “Diversion” 
coupled with the assumption that loans are cheaper than trade credit in their interest rate 
cost (meaning loans are preferred until rationed), results in trade credit being a secondary 
procurement measure in equilibrium.   
Empirical studies on the determinants of trade credit have tested all the theories on 
the importance of institutional differences. Meltzer (1960) looks at the effects of monetary 
and bank loan contractions on the flow of trade credit from large to small firms. His 
findings are consistent with the predictions of price discrimination theory in which large 
companies advance trade credit to small firms in order to boost their sales. Petersen and 
Rajan (1997) use firm-level data,
26  and test a number of hypotheses on trade credit 
determinants. First, they suggest that non-financial enterprises obtain different information 
than financial institutions. They then show that trade credit is used more frequently than 
                                                   
26  Their data are from the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF).   23
bank loans by high-growth, high-risk firms. Petersen and Rajan (1997) presume the reason 
to be information asymmetries between institutions. In addition, their estimation results are 
also consistent with non-financial firms salvaging value from inventories. Hence, they 
argue that their findings support the financial advantage hypothesis. 
While tests of institutional differences have been frequently implemented, tests of 
instrumental differences have not.
27  An important caveat is that we cannot exclude the 
possibility that the characteristic differences amongst instruments are much more important 
than institutional dissimilarities, even when the empirical results are consistent with the 
former. Estimation results may be severely affected by the instrumental difference between 
trade credit and loans, but if they are not controlled for, there is no way to tell if the 
institutional factors are more important than others. 
Empirical studies based on Japanese data, such as Takehiro and Ohkusa (1995), 
Ono (2001), Ogawa (2003) and Tsuruta (2003), are also susceptible to this problem 
problem. These researchers investigate the effects of financial institutions’ loan conditions 
on trade credit. However, while they do mention the effect of information asymmetries 
between financial and non-financial institutions when interpreting the estimation results, 
they do not fully account for trade credit characteristics. 
5.2. Trading Companies and the Relationship between Trade Credit and Loans 
We previously discussed the fact that different types of creditors have different 
incentives to supply credit, thereby affecting the relationship between trade credit and loans. 
In this section we take up two questions about the trade credit-loans relationship. First, are 
there other elements affecting this relationship? Second, do characteristic differences 
                                                   
27  Petersen and Rajan (1997, p 665) explicitly state that the transaction cost reduction hypothesis cannot be 
tested due to limitations with their data.   24
between these credit contracts dominate the relationship? We can answer these questions by 
adjusting for differences in creditor type. We analyze trading companies that make use of 
both trade credit and loans. Once we control across creditors we observe more similarities 
than simply the fact that these are both short-term credit instruments.   
Recipients of these credit instruments generally overlap with one another since 
trading companies generally supply credit to those firms that they deal with in commercial 
transactions. The quality of credit risk information is identical across the various 
instruments since large trading companies integrate all the credit information in their own 
credit examination sections. These examination sections approve all credit transactions of 
the trading sections in charge of individual client companies. Also, collateral, for loans or 
trade credit, is treated identically, provided it is supplied by the same firm. We, therefore, 
expect loans and trade credit to move closely with one another if there are no significant 
factors, other than differences in credit institutions, affecting the relationship between the 
two instruments. These remaining “factors” affecting the relationship, include the 
individual characteristics of the different debt contracts.   
In table 4-3 we observe that, after controlling for the creditor, the correlation of 
business conditions with the trade receivables to asset ratio, and the short-term loans to 
asset ratio are significantly different. However, these correlations do not control for factors 
other than business conditions and do not allow us to determine which of the two 
hypotheses regarding instrumental differences is correct. As discussed in the literature 
review, the two hypotheses emphasizing the importance of instrumental differences are 
each based on a distinct framework. As figures 5-1 and 5-2 illustrate the frameworks differ 
in terms of how closely purchases are tied to credit. When the provision of credit is closely   25
tied to the purchase of goods and services, a firm explicitly considers transaction cost 
reduction (figure 5-1). In contrast, when credit is not directly tied to the purchase, a firm 
considers the financial cost of each instrument (figure 5-2).   
To distinguish between the theories we rely on two different economic shocks, 
namely output shocks and monetary shocks. Since output shocks directly influence the 
amount of goods and services transacted we can test the validity of the transaction cost 
hypothesis. To test the diversion hypothesis we analyze the impact of monetary shocks, to 
see if the disruption of credit availability forces firms to compare trade credit with loans 
purely based on their financial cost and benefit.   
Our data are from the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by the 
Ministry of Finance and the Tankan Survey by the Bank of Japan. We focus on large 
(capital of at least ¥1 billion) wholesale corporations. The data are quarterly and cover the 
period 1967:1 to 2003:3. The dependent variables in our regressions are four ratios: trade 
receivables-assets, trade receivables-sales, loans-assets and loans-sales. Assets and sales are 
used to control for changes in the financial instruments due to changes in either the total 
stock of assets, or the flow of transactions. The explanatory variables: 
 
(1) DI of Business Conditions (All industries and the wholesale industry) 
 
A larger DI indicates better business conditions for corporations. It directly affects the 
transactions of goods and services and is a proxy for an output shock. It also stimulates the 
demand for funds to purchase goods and services. If firms prefer trade credit to reduce 
transaction costs, the coefficient on the DI should be positive for trade receivables. In this 
case, the coefficient on short-term loans should be negative, or insignificant, since loans are 
a secondary choice for procurement with goods transactions. 
 
(2) DI of Banks’ Lending Attitude (All industries)   26
 
This DI is the difference between the percentage of corporations that view banks as willing 
to lend and the percentage that view banks as unwilling to lend. We use this as a proxy for a 
credit, or monetary shock. A larger DI is an indicator of a better procurement environment 
for a firm. As pointed out in Ogawa (2003), it better represents the financial conditions of 
corporate Japan than other financial indicators, such as interest rates.
28  Due to higher 
procurement costs, credit provided by non-financial industries is generally thought to be 
more expensive than credit provided by financial institutions. But, trade credit also reduces 
the possibility of moral hazard on the borrowers’ side, because of the higher cost of 
diversion. We infer then, that a firm regards credit from non-financial institutions as a 
secondary procurement measure needed only in the case of its bank loans being rationed. 
Moreover, when trade credit and loans are offered by the same non-financial institution, as 
a substitute for bank loans, the supplier is likely to prefer trade credit to loans because of 
the lower probability of moral hazard. For these reasons the coefficient on this DI should be 
negative for both trade credit and loans, with a larger absolute coefficient in the trade credit 
estimation. 
 
(3) DI of Employment Condition (All Industries) 
 
A smaller value of this DI indicates that a larger percentage of enterprises regard current 
employment as insufficient. In this case, there exists a larger demand for funds to hire 
additional labor. We include this proxy for employment funding demand in our loans 
estimations since labor costs cannot be financed through trade credit, which only manages 
the inter-firm goods and credit flow. 
 
(4) Quarter dummies 
 
We include quarterly dummies since the included variables are not seasonally adjusted. The 
dummies are especially useful when we divide by sales. 
 
The estimation results are presented in Table 5-1. The coefficients of interest are 
on variables (1) (business conditions) and (2) (banks’ lending attitude). Most signs are 
                                                   
28  Since interest rates in Japan have recently been significantly near zero fluctuations in interest rates have 
been minimal.   27
consistent with our predictions, and many are significant. The results are consistent with 
table 4-3 where we observed positive correlations between trade credit and business 
conditions and negative correlations between loans and business conditions. The 
coefficients for business conditions are mostly positive for the trade credit estimations, and 
negative for the short-term loans estimations even after controlling for other factors in the 
regressions. These results support the predictions of the transaction cost reduction 
hypothesis. 
We also find that when banks are unwilling to lend, trade receivables extended by 
the large-sized wholesale companies increase. This is in line with the literature, such as 
Meltzer (1960), which has pointed out that larger firms extend trade credit to their smaller 
counterparts in cases of financial distress. In contrast, loans provided by wholesale 
companies show no significant responses. It may be that large wholesalers prefer trade 
credit to loans because of the smaller expected loss from trade credit due to the higher cost 
of diversion. 
In these estimations, we observe a significant difference between trade credit and 
loans even when they are offered by the same non-financial institutions. This holds even 
after we control for other factors such as labor costs, the flow of transactions and total 
assets. In addition, we test two hypotheses on the difference between trade credit and loans, 
and find that the results are generally consistent with the predictions of both of these 
theories. 
6. Accounting for Institutional Differences in the Relationship between Trade Credit 
and Loans 
In the previous section, we identified factors that affect the relationship between   28
trade credit and loans. Specifically, how closely tied the credit instrument is to its use, and 
the allowance for future uncertainties varies across these credit instruments. To determine if 
institutional differences, between financial and non-financial institutions, matter for the 
relationship between trade credit and loans we must now control for differences in financial 
instruments. In this section, we compare the response of loans extended by financial and 
non-financial entities to exogenous shocks
29  by using two different data sets. As in sections 
4 and 5 we employ quarterly data from the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations, 
but in this section we investigate the liability side of small- and medium-sized corporations. 
We also use firm-level data from the Survey of Financial Environment by Small and 
Medium Enterprises Agency of Japan (SFE) to identify the sources of loans obtained by 
borrowing firms.
30 
6.1. Aggregated Data: the Lending Behavior of Financial and Non-Financial 
Institutions 
In contrast to the previous sections, which focus on the investment side of 
large-sized trading companies and compare loans with trade receivables, in this section we 
focus on the procurement side of small- and medium-sized companies. We compare loans 
provided by financial institutions to those provided by other firms. Meltzer (1960) notes 
that small businesses tend to receive trade credit from large-sized firms and so it is 
appropriate to analyze these firms as receivers of credit. In this subsection we calculate the 
correlation between business conditions and two loan ratios, loans by financial institutions 
to total assets and loans by other institutions to total assets for all industries and for 
                                                   
29  It is of course impossible to compare the response of trade credit extended by financial and non-financial 
institutions since financial institutions cannot replicate trade credit. See Berlin (2003). 
30  For more on the SFE, see Small and Medium Enterprises Agency (2002, 2003) and Uesugi (2004, pp 7-8).   29
wholesale businesses. 
Table 6-1 displays the results. In both samples, loans display a significant, negative 
correlation with business conditions regardless of the source of loans. The negative 
correlation is robust to the inclusion of ten lags. Though the data is aggregated, we may 
presume that many individual firms obtain loans, not only from financial institutions, but 
from other entities as well. Under this assumption, dissimilarities on the supply side will 
result in the loan ratios displaying different dynamics. Since we observe no such 
differences in signs we conclude that loans by financial institutions do not significantly 
differ from those extended by other businesses. Therefore, our results are not consistent 
with trade credit hypotheses based on institutional differences, such as the financial 
advantage hypothesis and the price discrimination hypothesis. 
Furthermore, we observe a striking contrast when we combine tables 4-3 and 6-1. 
Within the wholesale businesses, trade receivables and short-term loans provided by large 
firms move counter to business conditions and within the same category of credit 
instrument, both loans by financial institutions and loans by other firms received by small- 
and medium-sized firms are significantly, negatively correlated with business conditions. 
These estimates imply that instrumental accounts are much more persuasive than 
institutional accounts in explaining the relationship between trade credit and bank loans. 
6.2. Firm-Level Data 
6.2.1. Firms Credited by Non-Financial Corporations 
In this subsection we implement a more detailed investigation of the lending 
behavior of financial and non-financial institutions. With a number of non-balance sheet 
survey items available in the SFE, it is possible to control for other factors affecting the   30
supply and demand for loans. We begin by summarizing the characteristics of firms, 
including general trading companies that purchase goods and services from other general 
trading companies and/or obtain loans from non-financial institutions. SFE asks firms from 
which financial/non-financial sectors they obtain loans. Non-financial sectors include 
companies’ representatives, their relatives, employees, affiliated corporations and selling 
and purchasing corporations. The SFE also contains the names of the principal suppliers to 
a company. This allows us determine from which firms the buying companies receive trade 
credit. This information is important in that it allows us to control for the companies 
receiving trade credit. 
Table 6-2 presents the characteristics of firms for several categories: (1) firms that 
purchase goods and services from the nine major general trading companies, (2) firms that 
obtain loans from non-financial corporations and (3) firms satisfying both (1) and (2). 
Firms in categories (1) through (3) are larger on average than the sample average in terms 
of sales, assets, and number of employees. Firms directly purchasing from the general 
trading companies are usually large primary wholesalers, which is confirmed by their 
inclusion in category (1).   
The composition of industries in categories (1) and (3) are skewed towards the 
manufacturing and wholesale industries. This illustrates how general trading companies 
locate themselves within distribution channels by not only supplying raw materials to 
manufacturing firms, but also working as sales agents for these same firms. In contrast, the 
composition of firms in category (2) resembles the make-up of firms in the entire sample. 
Also, procurement conditions are better for category (1) and (3) companies. Firms in these 
categories pay, on average, less for their procured funds, about 0.3% less than firms in   31
category (2), and firms in the entire sample. 
6.2.2. The Lending Behavior of Non-Financial and Financial Institutions 
Employing the firm-level data from SFE, we investigate trade credit-loan 
substitutability. Substitutability is investigated for firms obtaining loans solely from 
financial institutions, and for those obtaining loans from non-financial businesses. This 
allows us to determine the effect of institutions on the trade credit-loan relationship, which 
is a direct test of both the financial advantage hypothesis and the price discrimination 
hypothesis. 
The dependent variable in our regressions is the change in the loans to total assets 
ratio between 2001 and 2002. Explanatory variables include:   
 
(1) The change in the trade payables to total assets ratio   
(2) The change in the trade payables to total assets ratio for firms borrowing from 
non-financial corporations 
 
These two variables are used to test the financial advantage hypothesis and the price 
discrimination hypothesis. The two hypotheses contrast non-financial entities with financial 
institutions and predict significant estimates for the latter variable. Since trade payables and 
loans are likely to be simultaneously determined we need to select instruments for the trade 
payables variables. In section 5 it was made clear that trade credit is more closely tied to its 
use than loans. Since trade credit is used for the purchase of goods and services it moves 
with sales. Therefore, we use the change in the sales to asset ratio as an instrument for trade 
payables.
31  We also note that the relationship between trade payables and sales varies 
across industries and firm sizes. 
 
(3) Industry dummies 
                                                   
31  Sales can be endogenous if a trading company detects an increased credit risk and stops transactions. 
However, suddenly stopping transactions without concrete damages, such as dishonored notes, is considered 
an abuse of the superior status of the firm, based on the long-term relationship, in the Antitrust Act. This 
exposes large companies, including general trading companies, to possible litigation. Therefore, increased 
credit risk does not necessarily affect the sales behavior of large trading companies.   32
 
Industry dummies adjust for the inter-industry difference of factors affecting the supply and 
demand for loans. 
 
(4) The scheduled amount of investment   
(5) The change in the number of employees 
 
These variables represent a firms’ demand for capital and labor, which are expected to 
affect the amount they borrow. 
 
(6) The ratio of cash and deposits to total in 2001 
 
A measure of how illiquid a firm is, and, thus, how much liquidity it needs to obtain 
through loans. 
 
(7) A government credit guarantee dummy   
 
The Japanese government offers protection of bank loans when a borrower defaults. Upon 
receiving loans from financial institutions the borrower offers the government credit 
guarantee to lenders by paying an insurance premium. The supply and demand for loans are 
heavily influenced by whether the borrower is able to obtain a guarantee. 
 
We use two samples for estimation: category (1) and the entire sample. For each, in 
response to a sales-driven change in the ratio of trade payables to assets, we examine the 
significance of the difference between firms with non-financial loans and those with only 
financial institution loans. 
Table 6-3 presents the regression results. The coefficients on the change in the trade 
payables ratio are negative in all cases. This implies that trade credit and loans move in 
opposite directions over the business cycle. The degree of substitution, however, varies 
across samples. For the entire sample, those firms with non-financial institution loans have   33
significantly smaller coefficients, in absolute value terms, for the trade payables ratio 
change than average firms. A 1% point decrease (increase) in the trade payables ratio 
corresponds to a 1.65% point increase (decrease) of the loans ratio for ordinary firms, while 
for those with non-financial institution loans a 1% point decrease (increase) in the trade 
payables ratio corresponds with only a 0.57% point increase (decrease).
32 Conversely,  in 
the category (1) sample, the coefficients are not significantly different. A 1% point decrease 
(increase) of the trade payables ratio corresponds to a 0.77% point increase (decrease) of 
the loans ratio for ordinary firms, which is not significantly different from the 1.06% point 
increase (decrease) for those with non-financial institution loans. 
There are several ways to interpret the results. When we use the entire sample, loan 
supply behavior is significantly different between financial and non-financial institutions. 
This may be due to a possible capacity gap in collecting and processing credit information. 
Using the financial advantage hypothesis, we can infer that non-financial firms respond 
more quickly than financial institutions by exploiting their more precise credit information 
on borrowers. When sales decrease, trade credit drops, while the loan share of total assets 
increases regardless of the lending institution. However, the increase is smaller for firms 
with non-financial loans, than for those with only financial loans. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that non-financial firms respond less positively to bad news (sales drop). 
Conversely, for firms transacting with trading companies, no significant difference in the 
coefficients is detected. In this case, the financial advantage hypothesis, or the price 
discrimination hypothesis cannot be immediately accepted.   
In summary, non-financial businesses differ from financial institutions in their 
                                                   
32  Firms that receive loans from non-financial institutions may also borrow from banks. The share of 
non-financial loans is 33% among category (3) firms implying that these loans are quite important.     34
response to outside shocks, even when we consider the same credit instrument (loans). 
However, once we compare financial institutions with general trading companies, a subset 
of non-financial entities with much stronger credit examination sections and a more 
conspicuous financial advantage over banks, we see no significant difference between the 
responses of loans. Consequently, by noting that some non-financial businesses are not 
significantly different from financial institutions in terms of supplying loans, we have a 
qualification to the importance of institutional differences. Of course, to ascribe the 
differences between the estimated values to supply side factors, we need to fully control for 
demand side characteristics. In our estimation with the entire sample, where firms with 
non-financial institution loans are significantly larger than the sample average, we must 
adjust loans demanded by firm size.
33  If not, the discrepancy in coefficients may be due to 
demand side factors. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we focus on developing a clearer understanding of the relationship 
between trade credit and loans. Trade credit is supplied by non-financial businesses, while 
loans are advanced mainly by the financial sector. To compare trade credit and loans, we 
look at differences between creditors, and also at differences between credit instruments. 
Based on each of these differences, we separate the different hypotheses of the trade 
credit-loan relationship into two categories. While previous empirical studies have been 
ambiguous about which of the two categories is being tested, we are clear about which 
category we are testing, and are able to find that the hypotheses based on instrumental 
differences are possibly more important than those based on institutional differences 
                                                   
33  In contrast, among category (1) firms, average firm size, and the size of those receiving non-financial loans 
are not much different.   35
(between banks and firms). This finding contrasts strongly with previous explanations of 
the trade credit-loan relationship, such as the financial advantage hypothesis, but is 
consistent with the new line of literature represented by Bukart and Ellingsen (2004) and 
Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti (2004). 
Another intriguing issue we take up in this paper is the behavior of trading 
companies, specifically the financial activities of these firms. One of the interesting 
features of trading company credit is that not only do these firms provide trade credit, but 
they also supply other forms of credit, such as loans, stock investments and loan guarantees. 
We find varying degrees of responsiveness of these credit instruments to business 
conditions. When we aggregate these instruments we observe a significantly stronger 
negative correlation between trading company credit and business conditions in recent 
years. A possibility is a higher degree of commitment, by the general trading companies, to 
prospective client firms through stock purchases or investment. The positive effects of 
these stronger commitments, however, have yet to be seen. What is needed is to track the 
performance of firms who have obtained funds from the general trading companies. 
Another qualification is that trading companies have limited the supply of credit to 
relatively large-sized small and medium enterprises. Nevertheless, trading company finance 
is still a major component within the current flow of funds in the Japanese corporate sector.   36
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Table 4-1: Asset Items Provided by the Nine General Trading Companies (¥ billion) 










FY1960 679  48 27  16  73 
FY1970 5083  722  300  130  687 
FY1980 10652  1422  622  851  2744 
FY1990 14086  1706  1546  1961  3457 
FY2002 5347  1364  733  3738  3911 
Source: Annual financial statements of the nine general trading companies 
 
Table 4-2: Credit to all Japanese Corporations (¥ billion) 
  Trade Credit (Payables)  Total Loans from Financial Institutions 
FY1960 7959  8203 
FY1970 45730  45700 
FY1980 138162  166257 
FY1990 227669  410247 
FY2002 169782  370357 
Source: Annual Financial Statements Statistics of Ministry of Finance  
 
Table 4-3: Correlation between Business Condition DI and Financial Instrument to 









Investments and other fixed 
assets (excluding stocks, 
bonds, and long-term loans) 
DI(t) +0.4895***  -0.2320**  -0.3869***  -0.5348***  +0.0149 
t-1 +0.5072***  -0.2854***  -0.4578***  -0.5215***  -0.0257 
t-2 +0.5063***  -0.2389***  -0.5000***  -0.5076***  -0.0617 
t-3 +0.5014***  -0.2196***  -0.5155***  -0.4939***  -0.0828 
t-4 +0.4779***  -0.1005  -0.4848***  -0.4856***  -0.1066 
t-5 +0.4566***  -0.0102  -0.4183***  -0.4791***  -0.1144 
t-6 +0.4258***  +0.1213  -0.3128***  -0.4676***  -0.1201 
t-7 +0.3997***  +0.1994**  -0.2118**  -0.4529***  -0.1202 
t-8 +0.3701***  +0.2905***  -0.1224  -0.4413***  -0.1301 
t-9 +0.3585***  +0.3218***  -0.0517  -0.4401***  -0.1463 
t-10 +0.3523***  +0.3384***  -0.0027  -0.4457***  -0.1723* 
Beginning of 
Sample 
1965/4-6 1965/4-6 1973/4-6  1975/4-6  1973/4-6 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. Null is no correlation. 
Notes: Financial Instruments are for large-sized wholesale corporations with at least 1 billion of capital. Due to previous changes in 
format, sample periods (start date) differ for some items. All samples end 2003/7-9. Other liquid assets include short-term loans. The 
Diffusion Index (DI) reflects business condition for the wholesale industry. In constructing the index, the percentage of firms regarding 
current business conditions as good is subtracted by the percentage regarding current conditions as bad. 
Source: Financial Statements Statistics by the Ministry of Finance and Tankan Survey by the Bank of Japan   40
Table 4-4: Correlation between Business Condition DI and Ratio of Trading Company 
Finance to Total Assets 
  75/4-6～84/10-12 85/1-3～89/10-12 90/1-3～2003/7-9 
Correlation coefficients  -0.1256  -0.8607***  -0.5558*** 
Number of sample periods  39  20  55 
  75/4-6～87/1-3 87/4-6～88/10-12 89/1-3～2003/7-9 
Correlation coefficients  -0.0070  -0.8491**  -0.6260*** 
Number of sample periods  48  7  59 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. Null is no correlation. 
Notes: Credit Instruments are for large-sized wholesale corporations with at least ¥1 billion yen of capital. The Diffusion Index (DI) 
reflects business conditions for the wholesale industry, where the percentage of firms regarding current business conditions as good is 
subtracted by the percentage of firms regarding conditions as bad. 
Source: Financial Statements Statistics by the Ministry of Finance and Tankan Survey by the Bank of Japan 
 
Table 4-5: Credit Components of Wholesale, Manufacturing and Construction 












Investments and other 
fixed assets (excluding 




Wholesale 17813    5789 2162  9560  2456  54682 
Ratio to Total 
Assets  32.58% 10.59%  3.95%  17.48%  4.49%   
Manufacturing 41958  20636  4239  49732  13079  247069
Ratio to Total 
Assets  16.98% 8.35%  1.72%  20.13%  5.29%   
Construction 5183  3351  1035  2834  2470  33652 
Ratio to Total 
Assets  15.40% 9.96%  3.08%  8.42% 7.34%   
All Industries  82424  44083  15087  85623  35667  579572
Ratio to Total 
Assets  14.22% 7.61%  2.60%  14.77%  6.15%   
Source: Financial Statements Statistics by the Ministry of Finance (2003/7-9) (large-sized corporations with capital of at least ¥1 billion). 
 
Table 4-6: Correlation between Business Condition DI and Financial Instrument to 











Investments and other fixed 
assets (excluding stocks, 
bonds, and long-term loans) 
Wholesale +0.490***  -0.232** -0.387***  -0.535*** +0.015 
Manufacturing +0.661***  -0.136*  +0.130  -0.353***  -0.312*** 
Construction +0.078  -0.461***  -0.593*** -0.403***  -0.493*** 
All  Industries  +0.530***  -0.055   -0.104   -0.436***  -0.288** 
Sample Start  1965/4-6  1965/4-6  1973/4-6  1975/4-6  1965/4-6 
Sample End  2003/7-9  2003/7-9  2003/7-9  2003/7-9  2003/7-9 
# of Obs.  154  154  122  114  122 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. Null is no correlation. 
Notes: Credit instruments are for large-sized wholesale corporations with at least ¥1 billion of capital. Due to previous 
changes in format, some items differ in terms of sample start periods. All samples end 2003/7-9. Other liquid assets 
include short-term loans. The diffusion Index (DI) reflects business conditions for each industry, where the percentage of firms 
regarding current business condition as good is subtracted by the percentage regarding conditions as bad. For the construction sector DI, 
figures until 74/1-3 include the real estate sector.   41
Source: Financial Statements Statistics by the Ministry of Finance and Tankan Survey by the Bank of Japan   42
Table 5-1: Estimation of the factors affecting the trade credit and loans extended by 











0.051    -0.126***  0.108***  -0.046***  





 0.106***   -0.055***  0.116***   -0.021***





-0.182***  -0.166*** 0.006 -0.010  -0.077*** -0.069***  0.003 0.001 




  0.137*** 0.044*    0.059*** 0.026***
s.e.    0.030  0.026    0.008  0.008 
Quarter 
dummy 1 
-13.48***  -13.36*** -4.839*** -4.753*** 1.091 1.124 -0.803*** -0.776***
s.e.  2.427 2.323 0.699 0.763 1.743 1.665 0.200 0.227 
Quarter 
dummy 2 
1.491 1.259 0.754 0.454 -0.410  -0.594  0.086 -0.017 
s.e.  2.427 2.323 0.708 0.771 1.742 1.665 0.202 0.229 
Quarter 
dummy 3 
-12.35***  -12.41*** -3.824*** -4.004*** 0.535 0.494 -0.549*** -0.611***
s.e.  2.427 2.323 0.701 0.765 0.174 1.665 0.200 0.228 
Adjusted  R^2    0.445 0.491 0.471 0.369 0.222 0.290 0.388 0.210 
F-value  24.36 29.19 22.63 15.23 9.35  12.95 16.44 7.47 
Number of 
observations 
147 (From 1967Q1 to 2003Q3) 
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
Source: Financial Statements Statistics by the Ministry of Finance and Tankan Survey by the Bank of Japan   43
Table 6-1: Correlation between Business Condition DI and Loans by Financial and 
Non-financial Institutions to Total Assets (Small- and Medium-sized Firms in All 
Industries and Wholesale Business) 
  All Industries  Wholesale Business 
 








DI(t)  -0.3297*** -0.4608***  -0.4709*** -0.5118*** 
t-1  -0.3235*** -0.4685***  -0.4678*** -0.5043*** 
t-2  -0.3125*** -0.4619***  -0.4530*** -0.5007*** 
t-3  -0.2920*** -0.4504***  -0.4214*** -0.4876*** 
t-4  -0.2701*** -0.4305***  -0.3898*** -0.4803*** 
t-5  -0.2451*** -0.4286***  -0.3507*** -0.4807*** 
t-6  -0.2250*** -0.4188***  -0.3187*** -0.4852*** 
t-7 -0.2078**  -0.4149***  -0.2861***  -0.4900*** 
t-8 -0.1999**  -0.4072***  -0.2784***  -0.4827*** 
t-9 -0.1933**  -0.3985***  -0.2817***  -0.4703*** 
t-10 -0.2090**  -0.3795***  -0.3022***  -0.4472*** 
Beginning of 
Sample 
1965/4-6 1965/4-6  1965/4-6 1965/4-6 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. Null is no correlation. 
Notes: Credit Instruments are for small- and medium-sized all-industries and wholesale corporations with capital between ¥10 million 
and ¥100 million. All samples end 2004/1-3. Other liquid assets include short-term loans. The Diffusion Index (DI) reflects business 
conditions. In constructing the index, the percentage of firms regarding current business conditions as good are subtracted from those 
regarding current conditions as bad. 
Source: Financial Statements Statistics by the Ministry of Finance and Tankan Survey by the Bank of Japan 
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Sales 5902  million  y
en 
6061 7928  3894 
Current Profit  110  138  142  93 
Total Assets  5026  6101  6715  3886 
Trade Receivable  1378  1613  1729  895 
Total Liabilities  3533  4898  5225  2779 
Trade Payable  1102  1024  1499  648 
Loans 1799  2978  2674  1547 
Employees Number  105  136  179  88 
＜Industries＞ 
Construction  44 firms (6.
9%) 
46 (14.7)  4 (7.6)  844 (21.5) 
Manufacturing  357 (55.9)  106 (33.9)  35 (67.4)  1338 (34.1) 
Information  and  Telecommunication  2 (0.3)  2 (0.6)  0 (0)  36 (0.9) 
Transportation  3 (0.5)  16 (5.1)  0 (0)  116 (3.0) 
Wholesale  160 (25.1)  36 (11.5)  6 (11.6)  582 (14.9) 
Retail  23 (3.6)  25 (8.0)  0 (0)  269 (6.9) 
Real  Estate  7 (1.1)  22 (7.0)  2 (3.8)  117 (3.0) 
Restaurants  1 (0.2)  3 (1.0)  0 (0)  16 (0.4) 
Service  23 (3.6)  29 (9.3)  3 (5.8)  381 (9.7) 
Others  18 (2.8)  28 (8.9)  2 (3.8)  221 (5.6) 
Number of observations  638  323  52  3920 
＜Procurement conditions＞ 
Highest short-term interest rate  1.785%  2.111%  1.857%  2.075% 
Pressure from financial institutions 
(none) 
55.8% 49.2  54.7 55.1 
Pressure from financial institutions 
(higher rate) 
22.4 21.1  26.4  19.2 
Expand or contract of trade payable 
payment period 
1.950 1.953  2.000  1.964 
Number of Observations  660  323  53  4065 
Notes: Measurement units of items from balance sheets are in millions of yen. 
Category (1) companies state that they have one of the nine general trading companies as major sellers for them. Category (2) companies 
state that they have loans from their affiliated corporations, their selling and purchasing corporations, or other corporations. 
Source: 2002 SFE.     45
Table 6-3: Estimation of the factors affecting the loans ratio change (OLS and 2SLS) 
  Entire sample  Entire sample Sample (1)  Sample (1) 
 OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
Explained Variable  ∆(loans to total asset ratio) 
∆(trade payable asset ratio)  -0.609***  -1.648***  -0.604***  -0.772*** 
s.e. 0.034  0.159  0.054  0.248 
∆(trade payable asset ratio)*(dummy for 
non-financial institution loans) 
-0.026 1.081***  -0.454**  -0.292 
s.e. 0.113  0.359  0.181  0.373 
Industry dummy (construction)  0.020***  0.022***  0.029**  0.028* 
s.e. 0.006  0.007  0.015  0.015 
Industry dummy (manufacturing)  0.009*  -0.000  0.012  0.010 
s.e. 0.005  0.006  0.009  0.010 
Industry dummy 
(wholesale) 
0.005 -0.004  0.008  0.006 
s.e. 0.007  0.008  0.011  0.011 
Scheduled Investment  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
s.e. 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
∆(number of employees)  -0.0003***  -0.0003**  -0.000  -0.000 
s.e. 0.0001  0.0001  0.000  0.000 
Lagged cash and deposits to asset ratio  -0.028*  -0.043**  0.031  0.024 
s.e. 0.017  0.019  0.031  0.033 
Public credit guarantee dummy    -0.006  -0.004  -0.012*  -0.012* 
s.e. 0.004  0.005  0.006  0.006 
Explained variable in reduced form  ∆(trade payable asset ratio) 
F-value   15.85    3.45 
Explained variable in reduced form  ∆(trade payable asset ratio)*(dummy for non-financial 
institution loans) 
F-value   33.99    23.95 
Number of observations  3127  3127  533  533 
Notes: Instruments to ∆(trade payable asset ratio): (∆Sales/Assets), (∆Sales/Assets)*(dummy for non-financial institution loans), 
(∆Sales/Assets）*(dummy for construction small and medium enterprises), (∆Sales/Assets)* (dummy for construction small and medium 
enterprises)*(dummy for non-financial institution loans), (∆Sales/Assets） *(dummy for manufacturing SMEs), (∆Sales/Assets)* (dummy 
for manufacturing SMEs)*(dummy for non-financial institution loans), (∆Sales/Assets） *(dummy for wholesale SMEs), (∆Sales/Assets)* 
(dummy for wholesale SMEs)*(dummy for non-financial institution loans) 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
Source: 2001 and 2002 SFE 
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Figure 4-1: Balance Sheet Items to Total Asset Ratio for Nine General Trading 
Companies (aggregated) 
 
Figure 4-2: Balance Sheet Items to Total Asset Ratio for Large-Sized Wholesale 
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